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1 The City of London and government
in modern Britain: debates and politics
Philip WiUiamson
Substantial historical interest in the City of London is a recent
development. Financial historians studied its main institutions, some of
its leading banks and aspects of monetary policy, but it received little
comment even from other economic historians and was usually ignored
in more general histories. Only in the 1980s did 'the City', considered
as a whole, become a unit of study and enter the mainstream of histori-
cal attention, and only then did it attract interest from political scientists
and sociologists. Partly this reflected the contemporary prominence of
the City, due to the transformations which were then taking place in the
financial system and the publicity given to the fabulous incomes and con-
spicuous consumption of financial dealers. A larger reason was a shift in
the long-running debate about the relative decline of the British econ-
omy, meaning primarily manufacturing industry. After numerous other
possible 'causes' had been investigated, the financial sector now seemed
to be the chief culprit. At first attention focused on the supposed failure
of the banks and the Stock Exchange to supply industry with adequate
amounts or appropriate forms ofcapital. J Increasingly, however, the dam-
age inflicted by the City seemed more wide-ranging: except during the
two world wars, it had exercised the dominant influence over government
economic policy. Such claims connected with work by historians in other
fields, and gave the City, and indeed financial history, an entirely new
salience. Soon the issue of the relationship between the British govern-
ment and the City ofLondon acquired its own momentum, as it appeared
to offer cogent explanations for many features of Britain's domestic and
international experience since 1850.
The author is indebted (0 the British Academy for the award of a resc:ardt readership)
during which this chapter was completed.
I Helpful reviews of this debate are Y. Cassis, "British finance: success and conuoversy' J in
j. van Helten and Y. Cassis (eds.), CapiraUsm in a MalU.. &onomy (Cheltenham, 1990),
pp. 1-22, and F. Capie and M. Collins, Have 1M Banks Faikd Bn·rish Indusrry? (Institute
of Economic Affairs, Hoban Paper 119, 1992).
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The cases made for the City's influence over governmem have been
challenged, and some specific claims have provoked debates. This chapter
reviews the various arguments, and from a political perspective suggests
ways in which the discussion might be advanced. It urges more careful
specification of its leading terms, fuller consideration of the character of
its main participants, particularly what is understood by 'government',
and a wider investigation of influences on the policy process. Both 'the
City' and 'the government' have been more complex and more fluid enti-
ties, and been subjected to a broader range of pressures, than is some-
times allowed. The discussion of government-City relations has had the
strength of drawing together historians and social scientists from the var-
ious fields of economics, finance, sociology, government, politics and
imperial relations; even so, some disciplinary barriers remain, inhibiting
a more precise understanding of the extent and nature of the imeractions.
Debates
One of the earliest historical discussions of governmem-City relations
emerged from the debate on the causes of interwar unemploymem. For
Sidney Pollard, the government's determination in the early 1920s to
re-establish the gold standard was a 'bankers' policy': it expressed the
'specific self-interest' of a narrow section of the City and its spokesman,
the Bank of England, while the Treasury 'as ever' reflected 'the needs
of the City rather than the country', with terrible costs for industry and
employment. 2 Later, this type of argument was broadened as the main
issue became Britain's relative industrial decline, regarded as a persis-
tent problem dating from the late nineteenth century. For Pollard again,
'industry has every time to be sacrificed on the altar of the City's and
the financial system's primacy', because the Bank of England and the
banking community largely determined the Treasury's priorities]
Such conceptions also became integral to general interpretations of
Britain's long-term socio-economic and political development. At their
heart was a growing realisation that notwithstanding the 'industrial revo-
lution' the financial and commercial sector had always been a strong and
dynamic element in the British economy, indeed arguably more impor-
tant for its performance than the manufacturing sector. The general inier-
pretations drew suPPOrt from socio-economic and cultural studies which
2 S. Pollard. 'Introduction' [0 S. Pollard (cd.), The Gold Standard and Employmem Policies
between the Wan (1970), pp. 1-26.
J S. Pollard, The lVasling of the Bn'cish &ol1om.y. Bn'cish Economic Policy J945 to the f'tesenc
(1982), pp. 34-5, 73, 85-8, J50-1; also S. Pollard, Bn'tai,,'s ?n'me and Bn'cain's Dedine
The British Ecollomy 1870-1914 (1989), pp. 235-56. .
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independently concluded that the leaders of 'finance capital' were more
powerful than those of ' industrial capital', and after 1850 acquired a spe-
cial relationship with the governing landed classes. William Rubinstein
established that the wealth of the financial and commercial middle class
of metropolitan southern England exceeded that of the industrial mid-
dle class of provincial northern Britain.4 Youssef Cassis argued that a
merger of the City's financial elite with the landed elite had produced an
acceptance of City views on economic policy.5 For Martin Wiener the
social and cultural absorption of new middle-class wealth by old landed
wealth had produced a 'gentrification' of dominant values, smothering
the 'industrial spirit'. 6
The earliest of the general interpretations came from the 'new left'.
Perry Anderson argued that the survival of a 'pre-modern' ruling class
and its penetration by 'monied interests' explained both the conservatism
of the British state and the 'hegemonic' position of the City.? For Frank
Longstreth the banking 'fraction' of capital had achieved primacy in the
state system, which enabled the City to dominate economic policy and
'the political realm'.8 Geoffrey Ingham, in a sociological challenge to
these neo-Marxist interpretations, gave a different explanation. The Bank
of England and the Treasury were not mere instruments of the City, but
had independent sources ofpower and independent interests. Rather, the
City's 'hegemony' was the product of a 'core institutional nexus' of the
City, the Bank and the Treasury, bound together by their one mutual
interest - preserving 'stable money forms'.9 From a different perspec-
tive, Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins argued that prolonged alliance
between the landed and financial interests had generated a 'gentlemanly
capitalism', whose character explained the form not just of the British
4 W. D. Rubinstein, 'Wealth, elites and the class structure of modem Britain', Pasc and
P>-esenr 76 (1977), 99-126, and W. D. Rubinstein, Men of Property (1981).
, Y. Cassis, Cil)' BanJurs 1890-1914 (Cambridge, 1995; first edn in French, 1984), esp.
ch. 8; and see similarly) reaching funher into the twentieth century, M. Lislc-WiUiams,
'Beyond the market: the survival of family capitalism in the English merchant banks', and
M. Lisle-Williams, 'Merchant banking dynasties in the English class struaurc: ownership,
solidarity and kinship in the City of London', Bn"Ii,h Journal ofSociology 35 (1984),241-
71,333-62.
6 M. Wiener, Eng/ish Culture and the lJe4b'ne of the IndustTial Spine 1850-1980 (Cambridge,
1981), with specific references to the City on pp. 128-9, 145.
7 P. Ande""n, 'Origins of the present crisis', New Left &view 23 (1964), 26-53, and
P. Anderson, 'The figures of descenr', New Left &view 161 (1987),20-77; and see
A. Gamble, Bn"rain in Dedi"c. Economic Policy, PvlrIical Srraugyand the Bn·tish Scau (1981),
pp. 134-43.
8 F. Longstreth, tThe CityJ indusrry and the: state', in C. Crouch (at.») Stau and £Gonom)'
in Conumporary Cap;ralism (1979), pp. 157-90.
• G. Ingham, Capitalism Divided. The Ciry and Industry in Bricish Development (1984), esp.
pp. 9-11, 37,127-39,178-9,215-16,219,229-32.
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state but also of the British empire. As a 'branch of gentlemanly capital-
ism' the City had a 'disproportionate influence in British economic life
and economic policy making'. 10
These converging characterisations of the City's influence over the gov-
ernment, especially Ingham's concept of a City-Bank-Treasury nexus,
have had considerable influence. This is evident in studies of the bi-
metallism controversy in the late nineteenth century and the financial
crisis at the outbreak of the First World War; in Robert Boyce's discus-
sion of the 'politics ofeconomic internationalism' under the gold standard
regime of 1925-31; in an investigation of the emergence of Euromarkets
in the 1950s, and in a much-noticed 1990s critique of the contemporary
state. 11 In Ewen Green's review of the issues from the 1880s to 1960, the
City's lobbying power, strueturallinks with the state and overlapping eco-
nomic ideology with the Treasury ensured that, in the long run, 'banking
sector priorities were translated into government priorities'. 12 For Scott
Newton and Dilwyn Porter the power of the 'core nexus' was a lead-
ing explanation for the failure of industrial modernisation since 1900. 13
In such accounts government economic policy turned upon a contest
between the international interests of the City or 'finance' and the more
national concerns of 'industry' or 'production', with the City's interests
normally prevailing. This was not simply because of its economic impor-
tance and its provision of funds to the government. It also resulted from
further forms of power: an early integration of the financial and ruling
landed elites; the City's economic cohesion, geographical concentration
and physical proximity to, and institutional connections with, the gov-
ernment. The effect was that government always tended to identify the
City's interests with the national interest.
In their coherence, explanatory economy and treatment ofa long time-
scale, these conceptualisations ofgovernment-City relations have seemed
10 P.1. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas.
I. The old colonial system 1688-1850' and 'II. New imperialism 1850-1945', Ecolloml<
Hiswry Review 39 (1986), 501-25, and 40 (1987), 1-26; and P. J. Cain and A. G.
Hopkins. Bn"tish Imperialism, 2 vols. (1993; revised one-volume edn, 200 I).
11 E. H. H. Green, <Rentiers versus producers? The political economy of the bimetallic
controversy c. 1880-1898', English HiswnCaI Review 103 (1988),588-612;). Peters, 'The
British government and the City-industry divide: the case of the 1914 financial crisis'
Twentieth Century Bnrish Hiswry 4 (1993), 126-48; R. W. D. Boyce, Bnrish Capiralis':'
Qt. the Crossroads 1919-/932 (Cambridge, 1987), esp. ch. I; G. Burn, 'The state, the
CIty and the Euromarkets', Review of InUTnalional Politieal Economy 6 (1999) 225~I'
12 W. Hunon, The State ~Jre In (1995), pp. 22-3, 79-81, 112-36. I)
~. H. H. ~recn) 'Th~ mfluence o~thc Ciry over British economic policy c. 1880-1960')
mY. CasSIS (cd.), Fma11a and Fmanaen in European History 1880-/960 (Cambridgt:
1992), pp. 193-218. '
IJ S. ~~?n and D. Poner) Modernization Frusrrazed. The PO/ilia of Indwtrial Dediru in
Bntam since 1900 (1988): see the memes stated on pp. xi-xv.
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powerful and persuasive. Yet like other general interpretations they risk
becoming schematic and reductionist, establishing assumptions which
foreclose further investigation and exclude alternative explanations. Such
terms as 'the City' and 'government' might be given excessive force, and
be presented as unitary agents capable of uniform intentions. Coinci-
dences of outlook between the two might be mistaken for causation;
opinions ofparticular bankers might be elevated into 'proof of City dom-
ination, when quite different and more adequate explanations of govern-
ment decisions could be found. There certainly Seem to be difficulties
with these approaches. Doubts have been expressed about the extent
of the City's cohesion, its distance from industry and its political influ-
ence. 14 Episodes which appeared to be prime CaseS of division between
'finance' and 'industry', notably the debates on bimetallism and tariffs
before 1914, have on further scrutiny been found to be less clear cut. 15
The notion of an Edwardian 'identity of views between political circles
and banking circles,16 sits uneasily with the Unionist parry's adoption
of tariff reform, which challenged the City's long-standing attachment
to free trade, and the Liberal government's 1909 budget, which aroused
considerable Ciry protest for threatening capital accumulation. Against
the government decision in 1925 to restore the gold standard might be
set its original 1919 decision to abandon it, despite the recommendation
of its own bartker-dominated official committee, largely because of con-
cerns about unemployment and the attirudes of industrial labour. 17 The
outcomes of the sterling and budget crises of 1931, for all the allegations
of a 'bankers' ramp', were more the product of party-political manOeu-
vres than City or Bank of England pressure. 18 Nor is it difficult to find
friction between the Bank of England and Treasury officials or govern-
ment ministers, whether over use of the gold reserves in 1917, bartk rate
14 See the imponam sceptical commentaries by M. Daunton: • "Gentlemanly capitalism"
and British industry 1820--1914', IUs, and Presern 122 (1989), 119-58; 'Financial clites
and British sociely 1880--1950', and 'Finance and politics: comments', in Y. Cassis (<d.),
Financ~and Financiers, pp. 123-46, 283-90; and ~ome and colonial', TWDlcUrh Century
BritUh Hisrory 6 (1995), 344-58.
" See the A. C. Howe and E. H. H. Green debale in EnglUh Hisrori<al Review 105 (1990),
377-91,673-83; DauntoD, 'Gentlemanly capitalism', pp. 149-51; A. C. Howe, Fru
Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946 (Oxford, 1997), pp. 199-204,233-6; E. H. H.
Gret:n's modified analysis, ·Gentlemanly capjtalism and British economic policy 1880-
1914: the debate over bimetallism and protectionism', in R. E. Dumen (cd.), Gentle-
manly Capiro/ism and Brirish Imperialism (1999), pp. 44-67, and the Howe and Green
chap,ers 7 and 8 below.
16 Cassis, Ciry Bankrs, p. 308.
17 P. Cline, 'Reopening the case of the Uoyd George: Coalition and the poslWar economic
transitiOD 1918-19', JounuJi ofBn'rish Studies 10 (1970), 162-75.
18 P. Williamson, NenanaJ Crisis: and Narionol GovernmenL Brirish Polirics, r.he Economy and
Empire 1926-1931 (Cambridge, 1992), chs. 8-11.
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in the 1920s, credit control in the 1950s and 1960s, or public sector
expenditure in the 1960s and 1970s. Even combined Bank and Treasury
advice did not necessarily prevail: in 1952 a joint plan for an immediate
return to sterling convertibility ('Robot') was defeated by Conservative
ministers. Three major government enquiries on the financial system -
in 1929-31, 1957-9 and 1977-9 19 - artest to recurrent political doubts
about City activities.
More considerable still is the perspective in studies of the City of
London itself. For the period after 1914 these reveal much government
or Bank of England control, regulation and intervention, not only dur-
ing the emergencies of the twO world wars and their immediate after-
math - when it is accepted that the government overrode most City
activities - but even during 'normal' periods of peacetime. The gov-
ernment's borrowing and funding requirements, measures to suppon
the balance of payments, taxation policies, nationalisation of utilities,
credit restrictions and even labour legislation all affected, and frequently
inhibited, the business and international competitiveness of City firms
and markets. 2o In the 1970s a common City view was that the financial
community was 'the victim of government action and was incapable of
purting its case effectively in Whitehall or Westminster'. 2 1 When after
1971, culminating in 'Big Bang' in 1986, the government and the Bank
took measures to overcome restrictive practices within the City - prac-
tices created or encouraged by their own earlier interventions - its struc-
tures and activities were again decisively shaped by government action,
even though the outcomes were often different from what had been
intended.
Neither particular cases of City-government tensions nor a persistent
government imprint on the City are necessarily incompatible with the
argument that the City had a strong influence over economic policy. The
weight of particular episodes might still seem to favour the prevailing
interpretations, while the effects ofgovernment within the City could have
been of a different order to the City's effects on government. Neverthe-
less, such counter-cases and contrary perspectives emphasise the need for
caution. It may be that, as Martin Daunton has written, the 'notion that
economic policy was dominated by an alliance of the City and Treasury
19 R~speetiYely the (~acmillan) Committee on Finance and IndusLry, the (Radcliffe) Com-
mmce on the Working of the Monetary System, and the (Wilson) Committee [Q Review
the Functioning of Financial Institutions.
20 l"bcsc are leading thc:mcs in R. C. Michic, City of London. Cominuiry and Chan~ Since
21 1850 (1992); and R. C. Michie, Tile Lolldon Sux:k Ex<hallge. A Hisrary (Oxford, 1999).
M ..~oran~ Fmance capital and pressure-group politics in Britain'. Bnolish Journal of
Political SClm" 11 (198 I), 382, 399.
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is a regrettable commonplace of modern British history which obscures
other, and more interesting, features of policy formation'22
'The City'
The contrasting histories of the City of London by &mald Michie and
David Kynaston have both shown that as an economic entity the City
'defies easy generalisation'. It might be defined as a national and inter-
national clearing house, a collection of markets used by intermediaries
in trade, money, securities and financial services. As such its essence
and its strength consisted in the remarkable diversity and flexibility of its
activities23 Its markets and firms were highly specialised in their func-
tions, types of client and geographical areas of expertise, and even within
the City itself they operated in a highly competitive environment. Pre-
cisely because it was an international clearing house the City was vul-
nerable to sharp structural changes in the world economy - especially
the two world wars and the 1929-32 depression - as was its financial
sector to sudden international capital flows. Some instances of supposed
'City' pressure on government, notably during successive sterling crises,
are more fully understood as emanating from foreign markets and insti-
tutions. Another of the City's core businesses, providing funds for the
British state, meant that from the First World War onwards many of
its activities were subordinated to the demands of a massively enlarged
national debt. The effect was that the City's activities and its structure of
firms changed considerably over the century - from 1914 to the 1950s los-
ing much of its long-established commercial and international financial
business and becoming increasingly concerned with domestic finance,
before new forms of trans-national finance emerged during the 1960s
and re-established its international pre-eminence. 24
Assessments of the City of London's long-term influence over govern-
ment policy need to give careful attention to these changes in composi-
tion. Yet so diverse, fluid, competitive and prone to external pressures
were its activities, and so tied to the immediate conditions and fluctua-
tions of their specialist markets were its brokers, bankers and merchants,
that the ability of the City as a whole to form a coherent policy 'interest'
requires demonstration, rather than being taken for granted25 It can be
22 M. Daunton, 'How to pay for Lh~ war: state, sociery and taxation in Britain 1917-24"
English Historical Review 111 (1996), 916.
2J Michie, City of Lcndon, pp. x, 21-3, and see me evocation of complexiry and nuidiry in
D. Kyo_sron, The Cil)' of Loudou, 4 vols. (1994-200 I).
24 See Michie, City of Londofl, and his chapter 2 below.
25 For funher comment from various directions, see Daumon, 'Gentlemanly capitalism'.
146-51, and Daumon, 'Financial elites', pp. 139-42; R. C. Michie, 'Insiders, outsiders
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argued that the demands of its various businesses for easy access to and
ready international exchange of money did create common. interests - in
open markets, free international trade, a stable and converoble currency,
government credit-worthiness and low taxes. These were, however, very
general concerns which left room for differences over extent and means;
and once each was expressed as a specific policy preference, they could
conflict. For example, during the Edwardian period City men were faced
with a choice berween free trade and low direct taxation. Most opposed
Joseph Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign when it started in 1903, but
after 1906 an increasing number accepted it as preferable to the uberal
government's tax increases. 26
In practice, when historians use the term 'the City' they rarely mean the
whole accumulation of economic activities located in the City of London.
Most often it is treated as a synonym for the City-based banks, leaving
aside the commodity markets, trading companies, shipping interests, and
even the insurance markets and the Stock Exchange. Yet even here there
are complications. This 'City' is usually identified with only some of
the banks, and at different times with different types of bank. Before
the 1930s these are the leading merchant banks, with their international
businesses, but from the 1940s they become the clearing banks, whose
principal concerns were domestic.
Such semantic shifts in the historical literature indicate an important
point about contemporary meanings. From the perspective of the govern-
ment and the Bank of England, what principally constituted 'the City'
varied, not just over time but according to what seemed most relevant
for their purposes. There was 'the City' which rarely impinged on their
concerns, and which when it did tended to be regarded as a problem
or irritant. This was true of the Stock Exchange, whose interests and
opinions usually carried little weight in government or with the Bank27
There was 'the City' which handled the technical and normally routine
business of government borrowing. Its leading bankers were important
and needed to be consulted, but this business rarely gave rise to issues
which can properly be termed 'economic policy'. The 'City' whose views
were considered significant for policy reasons might consist of a different
an~ the dynamics of change in the City of London since 1900', JounzaJ of Contemporary
H"tory 33 (1998), 547-71; M. Moran, 'Power, policy and the City of London' in
R ~ng (cd.), Capital and PolilicJ (1983), pp. 49-51; S. Checkland, 'lne mind of'the
Ctry , Orford &onomic Papers, n.s. 9 (1957), pp. 264-5, 273-4, 276-8; R. Robens and
D. Kyoaslon, City Stale. How Ihe Markets Came to Rule Our WVrld (200 I), p. 17.
26 Sec Howe's chapter below, pp. 141-3.
27 M' hiIe e, London Stock Exchange, pp. 186,423-5,601.
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set of bankers; and as economic policy objectives changed - from maint-
enance of the gold standard to management of the domestic economy - so
the relevant types of bankers altered. Is 'the City' said to be important for
government policy in the 1900s the same 'City' which seems to influence
policy in the 1950s? How far can cases made for 'the City's' capacity and
means for influencing government in the 1900s be generalised to apply
to the 1950s?
'The City' as a whole was not organised as a pressure group or 'interest'.
In the early part of the century, occasional petitions to senior ministers
were organised by 'the bankers and merchants of the City', notably on the
issue of the 1909 budget.28 In 1920 there was even a joint representation
from the heads of the Bank of England, clearing and merchant banks,
Stock Exchange and London chamber of commerce, proposing a radical
solution to the problem of the postwar floating debt. 29 But these were
exceptional actions at the height of perceived crises, not part of sustained
efforts to shape policy - and they had little or no impact on govern-
ment. A 'parliamentary committee ofbankers' had only an indistinct and
transitory existence before 1914. From the 1960s some attempts were
made to unite 'finance capital', embracing all the various financial busi-
nesses within one organisation, but without success. Particular types of
bank or market members did form representative associations, such as
the Accepting Houses Committee and London Discount Market Associ-
ation, but compared to industrial and trade associations these were slow
to develop and, like them, were concerned with self-regulation, imple-
mentation of official requirements, and technical issues of direct con-
cern to their members, not matters of general economic policy. Some,
including the Accepting Houses Committee, were also weak and for long
periods practically 'moribund'. Only during the 1970s, in response to
increased government intrusion in the City, did pressure groups emerge
or older associations become lobbying bodies.3o Until then such activity
had seemed unnecessary, because the leading banks regarded the Bank of
England as its representative and channel of communication in dealings
with the government.
28 The Times, 15 May 1909, and see Kynasron, City oj London, n, pp_ 494-6, and below,
pp. 121-2, 140.
29 M. Daunton,]wr Taxes. The l'rJ/iti£s a/Taxation in Britain, /9/4--/979 (Cambridge, 2002),
p. 77. For another example, of coordinated leners from leading bankers during the 1931
crisis, see Williamson, National Crisis, pp. 282, 293.
JO Cassis, Cil)' Bankers, pp. 271-84; Moran, 'Finance capital and pressure-group politics',
pp. 385-6, 389-93, 397-9. In a similar shift, in 1979 the Stock Exchange joined the
Confederation of British Industries: Michie, London Srock Exlhange, pp. 486-7.
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The Bank of England
For some historians the Bank of England is part of the City, for others
an instrument of the government. This reflects both an ambiguity which
was always inherent in its various functions, and its changing relation-
ship with the government during the century. In some respects the Bank
obviously did act on behalf of 'the City', meaning those sectors of the
City which it considered especially important at particular times. As its
responsibilities included the stability of the financial system, it helped to
reorganise markets disrupted by war or depression, and to rescue ailing
banks and finance houses; indeed until the 1980s it tacitly guaranteed
the solvency of all the City's leading banks. Its expanding supervision
of the banking system and later other City markets and firms became a
means of protecting them from government interference. As the City'S
contact \\~th the Treasury and the elected government, it upheld or advo-
cated policies which it believed would benefit the financial system, and
protested against government measures which it considered damaging to
that system or its particular parts - on occasion placing severe pressure on
ministers by insisting that preservation offinancial confidence should take
priority over all other policies. Sometimes, as over credit restriction in the
1950s, it even obstructed government policies.}1 For all these purposes,
as far and as long as possible the Bank distanced, even insulated, itself
from government and defended its independence as an institution and
its control of monetary policy. These originally seemed to be guaranteed
by its delegated powers under the gold standard, and its being in private
ownership. Even after the final departure from the gold standard in 1931
transferred ultimate monetary authority to the Treasury and even after the
Bank was nationalised in 1946, it still asserted its operational autonomy
and right to give independent advice, even though this could contradict
the government's electoral or other public commitments. 32 The Bank
]I j. Fforde, The Ba"k of E"gla"d a"d Public Policy /94/-/958 (Cambridge, 1992), ch. 10;
A. Ringe and N. Rollings, 'Domesticating the "marker animal"? The Treasury and the
Bank of England 1955-60', in R. A. W. Rhodes (cd.), Trans/orming Bn"fish Gavemmem
I, Clta'lging bu[iwriom (2000), pp. J23-7. J
12 For excellent s[udic~ of these various aspects, sec D. KynaslOn, 'The Bank of England
and Lhc government and R. Robcns. 'The Bank of England and the City', in R. Roberts
and D. KynaslOn (cds.), The Bank of England. /\10nc."')/.. Power a,uJ Infiuenu. 1694-1994
(<?xford, 1995), pp. 19-55, 152-184j A. Cairncross, 'The Bank of England :relationships
wllh t~c govcrnmen~, Lh~ ci~il service and Parliament', in G. lbniolo (cd.), Central
Banks Independence m HlStoncaJ Pctrsp«n·ve (Berlin, 1988), pp. 39-72; M. Collins and
M. Bak.er, 'Bank of England autonomy: a perspective', in C.-L. Holtfrcnch, J. Reis and
G. TOOiolo (cds.), The Emergence o/Cencral Banking/rom 19181O the Present (Aldershot
199~), pp. .1~-33~ M. Moran, 'Monetary policy and the machinery of government':
Publrc AdmJntStrauon 59 (1981), 47-61.
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was notably successful in ensuring that the nationalisation act preserved
its position as the intermediary - or barrier between government and
the banking system, denying the Treasury powers of direction over the
clearing banks. 33
Nevertheless the Bank did not regard itself as merely the representa-
tive or voice of 'the City'. As its deputy Governor told the Macmillan
Committee in 1929, it considered its main duty to be 'to conduct its
operations in the interests of the community as a whole ... free from
the control of particular groups or interests'. While such statements were
chiefly intended to justify the Bank's political independence, they also
implied a position of independence within the City and a readiness, where
judged appropriate, to direct, control and discipline the activities of its
firms and marketsJ4 In the 1930s and 1940s this could involve pres-
sure on merchant and clearing banks to assist depressed industries or
small industrial companies, against the banks' own sense of appropriate
or sound banking business. 35 On a much larger scale, under the pressures
of war, depression and government economic management the Bank's
responsibilities as banker to the government and guardian of the cur-
rency and the financial system obliged it to playa large part in shaping
the City's financial srrucrures and activities. By its own operations or by
'moral suasion' it organised or regulated the money markets and capital
issues to suit the government's borrowing requirements and the funding
of its short-term debt. Together with the Treasury it imposed exchange
controls and embargos or restrictions on overseas investment in order to
stabilise the currency and the exchange rate. 36 From the 1940s it issued
'requests' - always treated as instructions - to clearing banks and other
financial houses for restraint in their advances: its objections were not to
the principle of credit restriction, but to Treasury views on method and
JJ S. Howson, Bn"tish A1onetQrj' Po/iry 1945-51 (Oxford. 1993), pp. 110-17; Ffordc, Bank
of England, pp. 10-13.
}'1 Sec P. Williamson, 'Financiers. the: gold standard and British pulitics, 1925-193 J', in
j. Turner (ed.), Bwi,1eSsmrn and Policies. Studies ofBusiness ACc1t1ity in Bn"cish Polio'cs 1900-
1945 (1984). p. 109. For an account ormis period with different emphases, sec Boyce,
chapler 11 below.
" R. S. Sayers, 71Ie Bank of England 1891-1944, 3 \'ols. (1976), I, ch. 14; W. R. Garside
and j. I. Greaves, 'The Bank of England and industrial intervention in interwar Britain',
Fi"ancial Hiswry Review 3 (1996).74-9; R.Coopey and D. Clarke, 3;: Fifty l~aTS IntJeSr-
ing in Industry (Oxford, 1995), pp. 16-23. Among the Bank's reasons was a desire ro
pre-empt government intervenDon in indusrry as well as in banking; defence of prh'ate
enterprise extended beyond the City [0 manufacturing companies.
30 Robcrt.s, '"lbe Bank of England and the City', 160-76, 178-81; Sayers, Bank ofEngla,uI,
I,chs. 9. 13, and II, ch. 19j S. Howson, Domesric ,Honcrory Manag.:menr in Bn'wi" 1919-38
(Cambridge, 1975); J. Atkin, 'Official regulation of British overseas investment 1914-
1931', &HR 23 (1970),324-35; D. Moggridge, Bn'tis], Monetary Policy /924-1931. 71Ie
Norma" Conqui!Sr of54.86 (Cambridge, 1972), chs. 7-9.
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degree. While these interventions were presented as being in the City's
general interest as well as the national interest, they nevertheless curtailed,
redirected, or cushioned the business of particular markets and individ-
ual firms. They were also the main reason for the growth of organisation
among City firms. These associations were encouraged or initiated by the
Bank in order to facilitate the implementation ofcontrols, regulations and
'requests' .
In significant respects the discount houses and leading banks became
'unpaid agents of the state', indeed were 'incorporated into public policy
making'.37 Ofcourse the relationship was far from operating in one direc-
tion only. In order to ensure the banks' co-operation, the Bank conferred
privileges on them, accepted their systems of self-regulation and restric-
tive practices, and had to be solicitous about their interests. Vet even this
tended to tie the banks to the Bank ofEngland, as they became dependent
on its assistance in preserving their cartels against unregulated competi-
tors. As the historian of the Bank during the 1950s commented, a wider
effect was that 'civil servants and ministers came to regard the banking
system as a crearure to be manipulated through the Bank in the inter-
ests of short-term macro-economic policies. Despite occasional public
and private protests the banking system became used to accepting such
manipulation, with damage to their own efficiency and to the services
provided to its customers.'38 The Stock Exchange underwent a similar
process. From 1914 onwards its business was impaired by Treasury as
well as Bank of England restrictions, but it learned to exploit these to
strengthen itself against competitors and became so accustomed to exer-
cising quasi-official responsibilities that it seemed almost 'an arm of the
state,.39
Although the Bank had responsibilities towards the government, plainly
it was notjusr the instrument of government any more than it was simply
the representative of City bankers. From Montagu Norman's early gov-
ernorship during the 1920s it had its own opinions not just on banking
maners but also on wider domestic and international economic issues.
Moreover, as the leading financial instirutions and associations communi-
cated with the government through the Bank, their concerns were liable
to b~ filtered through its own perceptions and objectives. In practice,
WIthin government 'City influence' chiefly amounted to the views and
interpretations of the Bank of England. These were expressed forcefully
37 M 'F' .
• oran, mancc caPital and pressu.re-group politics', 383, 387-8, 393-9; B. Griffiths,
The development of rcsuictive praaices in the U.K. monetary system' Manch.aur
Sdlool41 (1973),3-18. '
:: Ffordc, Bank ofEng/and, p. 782.
Michie, London Slock Exchange, esp. pp. 182-96 291-4 324-5 330 365-7 425-7
545,594,637. I J 'J J ,
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and tenaciously, and carried weight with Treasury officials. Nevertheless
after 1914 the Bank was always acutely aware of where the real power
lay. Even during the 1920s, a supposed peak of its influence, it accepted
that its monetary measures should take account of political considera-
tions, so - contrary to gold standard 'rules' - it managed the exchange
rate in order to minimise controversial bank rate increases.4O Insulation
from direct government intervention, though a form ofpower in terms of
banking affairs, from the 1940s probably became a weakness in relation
to economic policy, in that the Bank was detached from the processes
of demand management.41 From its perspective, assertions of indepen-
dence, even including its efforts to have the gold standard restored in
1925, were less demonstrations of strength than defensive or rearguard
actions against the expansion of government and against political pres-
sures for policies it regarded as harmful. After 1931 its sphere of inde-
pendence contracted by stages, as the government's efforts to stabilise
and then, from the 19408, to manage the economy intensified. Not until
1970, however, did a Bank of England Governor state that 'the Bank is
an arm of Government in the City' - though even then O'Brien insisted
on its special advisory role and his successor, Richardson, spoke of it as
having 'independence within government'.42 Plainly enough, the keys to
explaining the Bank's relative (but until the 1990s, declining) autonomy
and to assessing the extent of 'City influence' lie in the attitudes and
actions of the Treasury and the elected government.
The Treasury
Even more than the Bank of England, the Treasury manifestly had its
own distinctive concerns. For Ingham, this remains compatible with the
City's power because the Treasury's institutional interests within the state
bureaucracy caused it to align itself with the Bank and the wider City.
Certainly the Treasury's claims to be the chiefdepartment ofgovernment
were reinforced by its connection with the Bank as the main channel for
banking-government communications, and by their joint responsibility
for monetary policy. It was a relationship which Treasury officials jeal-
ously guarded, on occasion co-operating with the Bank to exclude partici-
pation by other departments.43 Negatively, though, Ingham's point has
40 Moggridge, Bn'fish MOTUtary Pblicy, cbs. 7-9j Kyoaslon, 'The Bank of England and the
government', pp. 27-8.
41 M. Monm, Til< Po/irics of Banking. The Strong< Case of Comp<o·,ion and C""Jj, Control
(1984), p. 24; Moran, 'Power, policy', pp. 54-5.
42 Kynasmn, fThe Bank of England and the govcmment" pp. 51-2; Moran, 'Monetary
policy', p. 49.
4) A good example, dittoed against the Board ofTrade, is noted in George Peden's chapter
below, p. 131.
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an underexplored implication. Government relations with the City were
not confined just to the Treasury, and investigation of other departments
or government agencies with interests and responsibilities in commer-
cial and financial affairs might complicate verdicts on the directions of
City--government 'influence'. For example, the Foreign Office had assis-
tance before 1914 from merchant bankers ready to lubricate its diplo-
matic objectives with loans, and in the 1920s from the Bank of England's
'financial diplomacy' in its efforts to advance European re-stabilisation44
Between the wars the Colonial and Dominions Office resisted Treasury
and Bank efforts to ration imperial capital issues. 45 From the 1960s inves-
tigations emanating from the Board of Trade and Department of Trade
and Industry forced the end of restrictive practices among clearing banks
and in the Stock Exchange.
It is also true that the Treasury's responsibility for public finances nec-
essarily made it anentive to the City's financial markets. Government
debt had to be made attractive to investing institutions, and these wanted
to be sure of government efforts to maintain 'sound finance' and to resist
inflation. But this did not mean that the government's position was weak
or dependent: the money markets and the banks needed the gilt-edged
securities and Treasury bills, as these formed the fundamental assets and
instruments for many of their activities. Nor did the Treasury require
Bank or City pressure in order to balance the budget, restrain public
expenditure, and check excessive public borrowing, because these were
precisely its own functions. As George Peden has commented, 'the Trea-
sury had its own reasons for pursuing policies of "sound finance" even
when these met the approval of the City'. 46 It had its own reasons too
for supporting sound money and open markets, because aside from their
supposed economic benefits it regarded these as supplying the economic
disciplines which reinforced its control of public finances. So, for exam-
ple, the decisions from December 19 I9 to impose deflation and return
to the gold standard were taken primarily on Treasury advice, reacting as
much to chronic domestic budget and debt management problems as to
Bank of England concerns with the City's international position.47 Any
wider 'City influence' was superfluous. Although Treasury officials and
Chancellors of the Exchequer readily admined their (surely inevitable)
44 P. 'Thane, "Financiers and the British Slate. The case of Sir Ernest Cassel' Bus'-nes.s
Hisrory 28 (1986), 80-99; Sayers, Bank of Eng/and, I, chs. 8, 15; but for late:, tensions
see Neil Fomes's chapter 12 below.
45 See Bernard Attard's chapter 10 below.
'6 G. C. Peden, The Trwsu,:>, and Public Policy, 1906-1959 (Oxford, 2000), pp. 12,518;
and see also hiS chapter 6 below.
47 Howson, DomestU: Jv10lUUlry A1anagemem, pp. 12-23 25-9 33-43' Peden Treasu"-Ipp. J40-58. ) , , , "J)
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reliance on the Bank's expertise in the financial markets,48 such state-
ments should not be mistaken for subservience towards the Bank, still
less the wider City, on broader financial and economic issues. Although
it was not until the late 1940s that the Treasury developed from a pub-
lic finance department into an economic ministry, George Peden, Susan
Howson, Roger Middleton and Peter Clarke have shown that during the
interwar years its officials were already generating their own sophisti-
cated economic understandings, which included the bearing of monet-
ary conditions on the broader economy49 There seemed good reasons
for regarding international financial stability and the international use of
sterling as beneficial for the British economy; for considering the City'S
overseas earnings and its contributions to the balance of payments and
to the demand for British manufactured exports as valuable for general
economic well-being; and, after the Second World War, for preserving the
Sterling Area and being worried about the potential damage of the ster-
ling liabilities and an adverse balance of payments. There seemed good
reasons too for defending sterling and the credit of British banks against
international financial panics or speculation, even if this meant asking
for assistance from foreign central banks or the International Monetary
Fund - and as already noted, Treasury reactions to such crises should
not be equated in any simple way with responses to 'City interests,.50 In
themselves these Treasury attitudes do not require explanation by general
notions of Bank of England or City 'dominance' over policy, though this
is not to deny that their influence was significant in particular Treasury
responses.
Vet the Treasury always had to attend to far more than just Bank advice
and any further City interests. Examination of particular episodes sug-
gests not only that where it agreed with them it did so for its own purposes,
but also that it was perfectly capable of rejecting their views or taking a
different approach. It was 'quite unmoved' by the City protest over the
1909 increases in direct taxation, and despite the imposing figures behind
the 1920 City plan for the floating debt - a remarkable (indeed ironic)
proposal for a temporary addition to the already war-inflated rates of
'8 E.g. Kynaslon, 'The Bank of England and the government', pp. 34-5.
49 Peden, Treasury; Howson, Domestic Monetary Management; R. Middleton, Towards fhe
Afanaged &onomy (1985), esp. chs. 3,5,8; P. Clarke, .rrne Treasury's analytical model
of me British economy between the wars', in M. Furner and B. Supple (cds.), Tk State
and Eccmomic Knowledge (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 171-207.
50 The point is well made for the mid 19605 in R. Stones, ~Gove.mmem-financerelations
in Brimin 1964-7: a tale of three cities', &onomy and Soa"ery 19 (1990), 36-41, 52, but
it applies also to other sterling crises from 1931 t'O 1992j and see the distinction made in
Robens and Kynasron, Gil)' Srau, p. 17, Qctwecn City firms and international financial
markets.
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income tax and super-tax - it dismissed it as politically impossible. 51
Once Treasury officials took overall charge of monetary policy after the
1931 crisis they ignored the Bank's wish to return once again to the gold
standard, and ensured that exchange rates and interest rates were sta-
bilised at levels which assisted industrial recovery. 52 While sympathetic
towards the Bank's efforts to restore market disciplines from the late
19405, over the following decades they could not accept its views on the
extent to which the balance-of-payments and inflation problems should
be met by public sector cuts and incomes policies. Indeed, for much of
the century the levels ofpublic expenditure and taxation were a recurrent
source of difference between them. Here the Treasury was itself usually
fighting rearguard actions, under Conservative governments as well as
Liberal and Labour - applying what brakes it could, but unable to arrest
the long-term trend towards increased spending and an expanding public
sector. It was not just that the Treasury could never wholly resist unwel-
come pressures from the spending departments. Nor was it just that as
part of the government it could not ignore interests other than those of
the 'City' - those of industry, labour, welfare recipients, and taxpayers. 53
The Treasury also had its own views on what constituted the best interests
of the government and the nation, perceptions which were independent
of particular economic interests because its responsibilities were not just
economic or financial: it had also to help preserve the political stability,
military security and diplomatic weight of the state. Most obviously of
all, the Treasury was not a free agent.
Government and policy
The strongest claims for the City's influence on government have come
from economic, social or Marxist studies. For political historians these
claims have surprising features. One is their socio-economic reduction-
ism, the narrowing of explanation to economic interests, financial elites
or 'gentlemanly capitalists' - this at a time when even social history and
studies ofpopular movements and elections were abandoning or consider-
ably qualifying notions of economic or social 'determination'. Although
the concept of a City-Bank-Treasury nexus does emphasise an inde-
pendent role of sorts for the Treasury, it practically ignores the most
public aspect of the state: the elected governments which, after all, had
final responsibility for financial and economic policies. Still less does it
:~ Peden, Treasury, p. 45; Daumon) Jw[ Taxes, pp. 77-8.
53 How~~)Domestic M~ne~ryManagement, pp. 80-95.
In addlUon to the studies m note 49, see fora more recemperiod C.11tain 'The Treasury
and Britain's decline', Po/itiro/Studies 32 (1984), 581-95. )
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encourage consideration of the further elements in the political system
to which Cabinet ministers had to attend: their own political parties, the
rival parties, parliament and the electorate. Politicians are very largely
disregarded, as if they were puppets manipulated by the Treasury or by
financial or producer interests. This effect is reinforced by the tendency of
histories of policy to be based overwhelmingly on the records of officials
held in the Public Record Office, perhaps supplemented by some gen-
eral political histories and ministerial biographies, but failing to engage
adequately or at all with the private papers and speeches of senior politi-
cians and with the specialist literature on party and electoral politics.
Two crucial dimensions of policy, those of party-political strategies and
broader 'political-cultural' assumptions, can be entirely missed. While
permanent officials manifestly could exert a considerable influence over
transitory and less expert ministers, it must always be recalled that their
function was to serve those ministers and, ultimately, to supply advice
tailored to their concerns. As an economist with much experience as a
government adviser has emphasised, policy is 'inherently political' and
has to be politically acceptable. 54
'Bringing the state back in'55 to the analysis - accepting that elected
governments and party-political competition are autonomous, and can
themselves shape economic interests, ideas and structures - has large
implications for understanding government-City interactions. Politics
generated its own preoccupations and imperatives, and it should not be
assumed that senior politicians identified themselves with, or responded
to the promptings of, a particular economic interest. For them the
national interest involved not just economic assumptions but sets ofpolit-
ical, social, moral and international concerns, while the party-political
struggle turned on efforts to combine support from numerous differ-
ent social groups and diverse bodies of opinion. No party, not even the
Labour party, could succeed by seeming to favour one 'economic interest'
alone.
Considered in these terms, the concentration on 'economic policy' in
discussions of City influence can be narrow and one-dimensional. It gives
insufficient attention to other types of policy decision which placed pres-
sure on economic policy and affected the context within which the City
had to operate. It is salutary to take a long perspective: much of what
leading City elements in the 1900s wished to defend was lost during the
54 A. Caimcross, Economic Ideas and Governmem Policy. Conrn'bup'ons to Economic History
(1996), p. 255. As Peden, Treasury, p. 160, notes, from PRO evidence alone it is difficult
to know whclher or not Treasury officials were ~writing to order).
" P. Evans, D. Ruescherneyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bn·nging the Stale Back In (Cambridge,
1985).
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next seventy years. These 'defeats' - on free trade, sterling's international
starus, taxation, Bank of England independence - were the outcome not
just of inexorable forces of global economic change, but of government
decisions and political debate. Above all there was war. The activities
and prosperity of much of the City from the 1850s depended on a stable
international economy: it needed peace, indeed from the 1890s some
leading bankers made efforts to reduce Anglo-Gennan tensions56 In
contrast to the government's eighteenth-cenrury wars which stimulated
the City's development, those of the twentieth cenrury were hugely dam-
aging to the City. After 1945 both Labour and Conservative governments
retained great-power aspirations, which gave them their own reasons for
continuing to artach importance to the international strength of sterling.
In 1964 it was very much the Labour leadership's decision to resist deval-
uation. 57 Yet from the late 1950s there were growing Treasury and Bank
doubts about the financial costs of post-imperial power politics and the
viability of the sterling exchange rate, while a new financial 'City' was
emerging which dealt in currencies other than sterling, and had little
interest in its fate. In domestic policies the priority that governments
gave to social and political objectives, especially following the impact
of the two world wars, expansions of the electorate in 1918 and 1928
and emergence of the Labour party, had similarly transforming effects.
The increased provision of social services and from 1945 the commit-
ments to full employment, demand management and nationalisation had
major implications for 'sound finance' and the operations of the financial
system. Yet in these policy fundamentals the Bank of England had no
influence. As government grew hugely in size, scope and impact on the
economy, and as political faith in the efficacy of the market declined or
was qualified (until the 1970s), so the significance attached to Bank of
England advice and 'City' views on marters beyond the financial markets
declined considerably. Just as the nature of the City changed during the
century so, still more obviously, did that of government: verdicts about
policy influence over the long term are doubly hazardous.
The sources of and constraints upon economic policy have been
complex, with party commitments and political manoeuvres being as
important as official advice, competing economic ideas and pressure
from economic interest groups. Nor have these elements been discrete:
what economic groups perceive as their 'interest' could be shaped by
past or potential government action; City bankers could be influenced
56 P. ~Jl1anc and J. Harris, 'British and European bankers 1880-1914: an "'aristocratic
bourgeoisie"?" in P. rInanc, G. Crossick and R. FJoud (cds.), The Pourer of !he Pasl
(1984), p. 223.
'57 A. Cairncross and B. Eichcngrccn, Sterling;lI De.di"e (J 983), pp. 160-93.
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more by their party allegiance than conventional views about their
economic interests. 58 The concept of 'economic policy' itself can be one-
dimensional, if it is treated as unitary rather than as a set of policies.
Given the party-political concerns of ministers and the pressures upon
them, these policies rarely had perfect economic coherence: their primary
rationale was political, not economic. As Rob Stones has argued, overall
policy was 'the result of a fractured and fragile set of processes', with
specific policies pointing in different, even contradictory, directions as
ministers attempted to achieve several objectives and to placate numer-
ous groups at once, with the effect that the government was placed in
several different relationships with any particular group such as the City
bankers. His example is the Labour government in 1964-7 taking mea-
sures to preserve confidence in sterling, while simultaneously pursuing
its own objective of domestic growth through credit and taxation poli-
cies which the Bank of England and City financiers intensely disliked. 59
Other cases can readily be found. During the early 1930s a display of
strict budgetary orthodoxy helped sustain financial confidence at a time
when cheap money, managed exchange rates and tariffs were being intro-
duced. Assessment of the presence or degree of Bank or 'City' influence
may depend on the selection of the policy or policies being examined.
Ofcourse some, perhaps many, senior politicians took no interest in and
were ignorant of banking and monetary issues, leaving themselves at the
mercy of Treasury and Bank advice. Notoriously, Lord Passfield (Sidney
Webb) as a former member of the 1931 Labour Cabinet declared after
the suspension of the gold standard that 'nobody even told us we could
do that,60 But too much should not be concluded from such examples.
As Anthony Howe, Ewen Green and Jim Tomlinson show,61 each party
had politicians who were certainly not intimidated or much impressed by
Bank or even Treasury views. In contrast to the Labour ministers during
the 1931 crisis, Conservative ministers in the new National Coalition gov-
ernment were so self-assured in their own assessments of financial confi-
dence and so intent on their party objectives that they ignored the Bank's
direst warnings, until the Bank eventually concluded that further defence
58 Good instances of economic histories of policy which address its complexities, includ-
ing the political dimensions, are J. lbmlinson, Public PoliO' and the Economy since
1900 (Oxford, 1991), and R. Middleton, Governmem versus the Markel. The Growth
of the Public Sector, Economu Managemenr and Bn"nsh Economic Performan.ce c. 1890-1979
(Cheltenltam, 1996).
59 Stones, <Government-finance relations in Britain\ 33 and passim.
60 As originally noted in DaltOn diary, 12 Jan. 1932, quoted in Williamson, Nariona1 Cri-
sis, p. 14. Maners had, however, becn considerably morc complicafcd than this artlcss
sralcmcm implies: see Williamson, National Crisis, ch. 9.
61 Chaplers 7-9 below.
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of sterling was futile. 62 A common politician's view of 'City opinion' was
that it was hopelessly irrational, fickle, self-interested, politically unreal-
istic, and anyway likely to be divided. 63 One striking suggestion about
City influence, that it could be decisive in the choice of Chancellors of
the Exchequer, should be treated with scepticism: party and personal
considerations were always more important. 64 Nevertheless, it may seem
remarkable that governments for long left the Bank of England and the
financial City with substantial independence and that, with the excep-
tion of the Labour party from 1931 to 1945, the political parties did not
make them subjects for political campaigns or election manifestos. Part
of the explanation was the political promise, pressure or constraint of
other, apparendy more pressing, issues. Of greater importance were the
successive forms of 'governing' political economy.
The politics of political economy
In the commonly Marxist or marxisam accounts of City 'hegemony' over
economic policy, the British state is assumed to have been a committee for
organising the affairs of the dominant socio-economic elite or alliance.
There is, however, a different understanding of the state which better
explains the nature of government and policy over the last two cenruries.
By directing attention to the political aspects of the 'orthodox' economic
doctrines inherited from the nineteenth cenrury, this also explains the
unusual position of the Bank of England and 'the City' without making
excessive claims about their power.
The purpose of the major financial and commercial reforms from the
late 1810s to the 1850s was not simply economic. Faced with severe
social unrest and radical protest, the chief preoccupations of successive
governments were political stabilisation, integration and legitimation.65
62 Williamson. National Crisis, pp. 328-30, 410-16.
6) E.g. Thane. 'Financiers and the British state' J pp. 89, 95; Kynaston. City of London, Ill,
pp. 5,62, J 10; Daunton, 'How to pay for the war, pp. 905-8.
64 Cf. Boyce, Bn"luh CapiuzJiml at the Crossroads, pp_ 21, 72-3. 380n.64. and Peden. Trea-
SUr)!, pp. 12, J93, 430. There are difficulties with the evidence adduced for the cases
usually cited. That for the 1919 appoinoncnt consists of speculation by the Chancel-
10f. Austen Chamberlain, not an explanation from the Prime Minister, Uoyd George.
Baldwin as Prime Minister in 1923 and 1924 did mention Ciry opinion, bUI only as one
factor and only in the context of trying to persuade a reluctam Neville Chamberlain
to accept the chancellorship, statements unlikely to have revealed the main reasons for
his choice. Home, suPP?scdly disliked in the City for his 1921-2 chancellorship, had
n,cvenhcless been Baldwm's first choice in 1923, and his refusallhen (and changed parry
Clrcum~tanccs)meant that there was no question of his being offcn~~d the post in 1924.
The eVidence for LynchoD in 1951 is retrospective and ambiguous.
65 For this p~ragrap~ and the neXl, see P. Harling and P. Mandler, 'From "fiscal-military"
state to laissez-faire stale\ Journal oj Bn'tis}, Studies 32 (1993),44-70; B. Hilton, Corn,
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Senior politicians of all parties, sharing an autonomous ethos of 'good
government', sought to defend authority, hierarchy and property in gen-
eral, more than the interests of any specific economic group or section
of the propertied classes. Indeed, in order to disarm radical criticism
and restore confidence in established institutions, the agreed principle
was that government had to be seen to be free from dependence upon,
obligation towards and pressure from particular interests - including the
Bank of England and the City. Accordingly, as far as possible the state
ceased to be a participant in economic activities. With the gold standard,
the Bank Charter Act, free trade and balanced budgets, governments cre-
ated a framework for free markets, an automatic mechanism for economic
adjustments and 'rules' for public finance. This was the political essence
ofVictorian laissez-faire, later extended to that other highly sensitive area,
industrial relations. A minimal, non-interventionist state that was - or was
successfully presented as - impartial towards competing interests would
also be a strong state, able within conventional political limits to pursue
its own purposes and meeting little resistance in financing its activities.
These reforms were carried l\gainst oPl1.osition from the Bank of
England and City commercial interests, some of which were severely hit
by the loss of 'mercantilist' and tariff legislation. On the other hand, the
reforms assisted a new breed of merchants and financiers able to exploit
the great expansion of the international and British economies from the
1850s to 1914. Government had not just exerted its supremacy over the
City; however unintentionally, it had also taken a large part in reconstruct-
ing its economic activities. Although in the event new City interests were
beneficiaries of the reforms, it does not follow that the gold standard, free
trade and 'sound' public finance became their special ideological prop-
erty.66 These doctrines and the associated concept of a 'disinterested'
state continued to serve the purposes of the political parties and gov-
ernment officials, by excluding from 'politics' a range of actions which
might destabilise not just the financial and economic system, but also
each party's political position and even the political system itself. These
doctrines also became embedded in general political culture, because
notwithstanding some challenges from the 1880s they were on balance
Cash, Commerce (Oxford, 1977), esp. chs. 2, 8, and conclusion; Howe, Free Trade and
Liberal E"gland, pp. 13-23, 55-{)4; R. McKibbin, The Ideologies o/Clas,. Social Relations
i" Bn'cai" 1880-1950 (Oxfon!, 1990), pp. 26-32,38; P. Thane, 'Government and societY
in England and Wales, 1750-1914', in F. M. L. Thompson (cd.), The Cambridge Social
Hiscory 0/ Bn'cai" 1750-1950, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1990), IU, esp. pp. 26-33; Daunton,
'Home and colonial', pp. 351--6, and DaunlOn, Trwn"ng Leviathan. The PtJliri£.s of Taxarion
i" Bricai" 1799-1914 (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 26-7, 378, 388.
66 Cf. Ingham, Capitalism DivUkd, pp. 112, 130-1; Cain and Hopkins, Bn"tish Impen"a1ism,
I, p. 83.
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perceived as being 10 the economic and political advantage of all signifi-
cant groups, including the working population, 'which was especially loyal
10 free trade as a guarantee oflow living costs.
For the period up 10 1914 the term 'economic policy' is a misnomer.
Governments directed their own finances without supposing this 10 have
economic implications. They devolved monetary supervision as a purely
technical issue, under gold standard conventions, 10 the Bank ofEngland;
and they recognised no responsibility for general economic activity, or
for industry and banking. Economic life and political life were separate
spheres. The Bank and 'the City' had independence from government,
nO! power over its policies. Party politics was concerned with constitu-
tional, denominational and moral issues, and to a lesser extent foreign
policy and social reform. This explains why tariff reform, an attempt 10
change the terms of political debate - and in its inception and defeat it
was always a party-political episode, not a competition between industrial
and financial sectors67 - caused such party and eleclOral dislocation.
The impact of the First World War placed economic and social issues
firmly on the political agenda. Yet these new conditions made the tradi-
tional financial constraints on government seem still more essential. The
wartime experience of government controls and negotiation with eco-
nomic interests, the enlarged postwar eleclOrate, and the strength and
radicalism of the Labour movement increased the likelihood that party-
political competition and pressure from economic groups would subvert
public finance and the currency. The postwar inflation, occurring while
the financial disciplines remained suspended, gave practical and fright-
ening demonstration of the dangers. For the Bank of England and the
Treasury the gold standard, the balanced-budget rule and a new ele-
ment, the 'Treasury view' inhibiting public investment, now acquired still
stronger political purposes. A good indication is the heightened rhelOric:
that of Treasury officials when defending the Bank's independence in
setting bank rate, of the Bank in insisting on its political neutrality and
of the leading government advisor, Bradbury, in famously describing the
gold standard as 'knave-proof. It could not be rigged for political or even
more unworthy purposes.'68 These Bank and Treasury efforts to rein-
force political checks were directed not just against the Labour party, but
67 Gr~c:.n) 'Gcntlcma~lycapitalism') p. 58, suggests that the tariff reform campaign was a
political ancmpt 10 COnsrruCl an industrial intercSL
68 P. J: Grigg. ~ejut!,~e and J~dK!flenr.< 19;8), p. 183, and SC~ Moggridge, En·cish Monecary
Pol,cy,.p. I??' Wdhamso~, .rma~ctcrs I pp.. 107-11; R. Middleton, 'The Treasury in the
19305. pohucal and admlnlsrratlve consuamls to acceptance or the "new" economics'
~:~o:;Economic Papers 34 (1982),59-61,63-4; Peden, Treasury, pp. 13 ]-2, lSD-I, 158:
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against politicians of all parties; their complaints began under the Coali-
tion government, and continued under its Conservative successors. 69
In so far as the Bank and the Treasury succeeded, this was only
because the same political and economic logic was accepted - u1timately-
by senior government ministers themselves. As monetary and banking
issues threatened to become politically as well as economically signifi-
cant, Chancellors of the Exchequer took more interest in them and were
particularly sensitive over increases in bank rate - but only in private.
In public they upheld the Bank's independence, just as they accepted
the gold standard. They did so because they agreed that the stability of
the currency and the banking system were too important to be exposed
to party competition; because there were obvious advantages in govern-
ments not being responsible for ostensibly unavoidable, yet now usually
unpopular, monetary decisions; and because the gold standard strength-
ened their own hands in imposing budget control. Although Churchill
tested his advisers' resolve over the rerurn to gold and later regretted
the decision, Keynes's presentation of him as an economic innocent led
astray by the financial authorities is misleading: in 1925 he was well versed
in, and pre-disposed towards, the orthodox economic doctrines70 When
he did seriously challenge a bank rate increase, in February 1929, the
Conservative Cabinet overruled him, formally resolving that the govern-
ment did not control the Bank of England's policy. Labour party politics
had always been overwhelmingly focused on industrial and labour issues,
and little thought was given to monetary issues: like free trade, 'sound
money' was assumed to be a necessary condition for decent living stan-
dards among the poor and for the security of the skilled workers' savings
and trade unions' funds. While the Labour Chancellor in 1929, Snowden,
had doubts about the availability of industrial investment - hence his
appointment of the Macmillan Committee - he too accepted the distinc-
tion between 'technical' and 'political' spheres, and publicly insisted that
the Bank had to be free from political interference71 Nevertheless, in
practice the Bank's policies were inhibited by political pressures, while
the Conservative government was hardly more prepared than the Labour
governmenr to limit social expendirure and taxation to the levels favoured
by the Bank and the wider City. Senior politicians of both major parties
had imprisoned themselves within incompatible policies, adopting the
69 E.g. Kynaslon, Gil)' of umdoll, Ill, pp. 61, 112, 128-9; cf. Ingham, Capicalism Divided,
p.I73.
70 See I'. Clarke, 'Churchill's economic ideas 1900-1930', in R. Blake and W. R. Louis
(eds.), Churchill (Oxford, 1993), pp. 79-95.
71 Moggridgc, Bn'rish Monetary Policy, pp. 161-4; Kynastoo, 'lne Bank of England and
the govcrnmem', pp. 27--8.
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gold standard yet persisting with social reforms, unemployment payments
and (notwithstanding the coal and general strikes) industrial conciliation
to an extent which precluded the degree of deflation now required to
maintain it.
Even after the 1931 deparrure from gold, the traditional rationale for
insulating monetary issues from political pressures remained strong. Past
and present Chancellors of the Exchequer in the National government
secured a Cabinet decision that 'government control' of the Bank's pol-
icy was 'undesirable'. By this was meant control by politicians, so the
effect was to leave the final direction of monetary policy with Treasury
officials72 This was not enough for the Labour party which, having
persuaded itself that it had been the victim of a 'bankers' ramp', now
extended socialism to embrace nationalisation of the Bank of England
and the clearing banks, and creation of a National Investment Board.73
Nor was it enough for other 'progressive-minded' politicians: in the after-
math of the depression of 1929-32, proposals for government direction
of investment were widely canvassed, even by some Conservatives.
That such radical changes in the banking system were not introduced
was essentially a consequence of the politicians' acceptance of a new
political economy during the 1940s. At first the 1945 Labour govern-
ment thought that Bank of England nationalisation and continuation of
wartime physical controls over finance made further banking nationalisa-
tions and a National Investment Board unnecessary. These seemed still
less necessary after it switched towards 'Keynesian'-style demand man-
agement, which rurned attention away from monetary issues towards
fiscal policy.74 This had a double effect for the Bank of England and the
financial City. Because monetary issues had been relatively marginalised,
the Bank, tacitly supported by Treasury officials, was able to exploit
the 'customary assumptions'75 and re-establish elements of its indepen-
dence from government. Nevertheless within government the Bank's
and City's concerns had become just one element in a wider regime
of macroeconomic management, and ministers now not only accepted
72 Williamson, National Crisu, pp. 497-50 I. In similar style, tariffs and new arrangements
for un~mployment 'doles' were neutralised by being placed in the hands of'non-political'
agenCles.
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responsibility for monetary policy but also had alternative sources of
advice on these issues, from the recruitment of professional economists
into government service76 Although the politicians had, largely by inad-
vertence, allowed the Bank to retain the ability to argue its case and act
as a buffer berween government and the banks, the larger reality was its
subordination to the priorities of full employment and the welfare state.
This became evident during the 'Robot' episode in 1952. It is significant
that the Bank and some Treasury officials seized upon the change from a
Labour to a Conservative government to propose what was, in essence,
an attempt to impose a new form of the earlier 'automatic' monetary
and financial disciplines on government. But it is much more significant
that the scheme was rejected by a group of ministers determined to avoid
the political risks not just of allowing unemployment to rise, but also of
appearing to succumb to 'City' pressure - to what they feared would be
presented as 'Montagu Normanism' or 'a bankers' ramp'.77
From the mid 1950s to the mid 19705 new pressures - balance of
payments deficits, the effort to accelerate growth, persistent inflation -
increasingly persuaded Chancellors of the Exchequer that for effective
demand management fiscal measures were not nearly enough. Trea-
sury involvement in monetary and banking grew, slowly but inexorably.
Despite various spells of resistance, the Bank could not prevent erosion of
its operational independence and its ability to deflect government interest
in financial institutions.78 Thereafter, from the mid 1970s, the perceived
failure of'Keynesian' management and abandonment offull employment
as the primary policy objective produced a complex and paradoxical sit-
uation for government relations with the Bank and the City. The new
Conservative government's encouragement of free markets helped stim-
ulate a boom in the financial sector, but also ended the City's restrictive
practices and forced rapid changes in the ownership of many firms. The
government's 'monetarist' doctrines reasserted the centrality of monet-
ary policy, but with the effect of further tightening Treasury control over
the Bank's conduct of policy.79 Yet in the new conditions ofvolatile inter-
national financial markets, such close political control over monetary
76 Cairncross, 'Bank of England' J pp. 49-51; Collins and Baker, 'Bank of England auton-
omy', pp. 16-17; and for ~conomic advice, Peden, Treasury, pp. 24, 372-4,437-9.
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chapler below, pp. 269--72.
78 Ringe and Rollings, 'Domesticating the "market animal"', pp. 123-7; Moran, 'Monetary
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policy weakened confidence in the government's ultimate ability to resist
inflation. The effect was that its other policies were exposed to disrup-
tions caused by problems with sterling. In these circumstances, accep-
tance of the Bank of England's independence in monetary policy once
again became an attractive political strategy for senior members of both
the Conservative and Labour parties. Maners had not really come full
circle - conditions had changed too much since the early part of the cen-
tury to be comparable - but again the motive was less subservience to the
City than a determination to restore government credibility and regain
greater freedom to pursue other policy objectives.
